Westray tragedy mired in fresh controversy

Inquiry may have been unaware of defective methane-detectors Lawyers representing the families of some of the miners killed in the May 1992 explosion at the Westray coal mine are weighing new information that points to “potential problems” with the methanometers used on Westray’s continuous mining machines.

Recent articles by Dean Jobb, staff reporter at The Halifax Herald and author of Calculated Risk: Greed, Politics and the Westray Tragedy, suggest that the Nova Scotia inquiry investigating the disaster was not aware of a design defect that might have rendered the detectors useless.

The information came to light in August of this year when Adrian White, a former executive of Westray owner Curragh Resources, obtained evidence that the model of methanometer used at Westray required a “simple but necessary” modification to prevent mine operators or other individuals from improperly adjusting the settings. The monitors were the subject of a U.S. government safety recall notice in May 1995, a year before the Westray inquiry began.

White also points to “sworn testimony” admitting that tampering occurred on May 9, 1992, mere hours before the explosion, “of the type described in U.S. government notices, that would render the methane monitors useless.”

While the Westray report — released one year ago — did find evidence that there was tampering with the methanometer on the continuous miner, it concluded that “the evidence does not support a finding that this tampering in any way caused the explosion.”

However, this conclusion was based on the assumption that the methanometer was not accurately recording methane concentrations. White argues that the scope of the inquiry “may have been different” had it been known that tampering could have rendered the monitors useless.

White says the inquiry should have examined other issues in greater detail, including a report from a mining consultant who questioned whether the detector was operating properly. He also cites a separate newspaper article (published this summer) in which a director of Brunswick Mining & Smelting stated that the company’s underground rescue team, which had been sent in to help find survivors and reasons for the disaster, “found evidence of open flames and dangerous machinery in the mine, as well as the residue of forbidden smoking activity.”

In the inquiry, Justice Peter Richard was charged with addressing two main questions: how did the 26 miners die at Westray, and why? His report, entitled The Westray Story, concluded that “the source of ignition that caused the methane accumulation to catch fire most probably was the cutting mechanism or picks of the continuous miner, which, when they struck either pyrite or sandstones, caused sparks of sufficient intensity to light the gas.”

His report states that the continuos miner was “likely operating” at the time of the explosion “since the shuttle car was partially filled, the switches of the miner were in the run position, the conveyor on the miner had coal on it, the position of the cutting heads indicated that the miner was operating, and the evidence suggests sparking at the miner. There is sufficient evidence on which to base the finding that the continuous miner was operating at the time of the ignition, or very close to it.”

Justice Richard acknowledged that his view was contrary to the conclusion suggested in a final submission to the inquiry by the United Steelworkers of America, local 9332. This submission stated that the continuous miner was on, “but [that] it was pulled back two or three feet from the face. Most of the coal on its conveyor had run through, suggesting the operator was not cutting coal at the time he decided to leave the machine.”

Several other witnesses suggested that a boom truck was the most likely source of ignition. Though built as a flame-proof diesel truck, it had been modified extensively and was believed to be no longer flame-proof.

However, after weighing all the evidence, Justice Richard concluded that the continuous miner was the “most probable source” of the sparking that triggered the explosion. He also cited statistical evidence showing that of 954 recorded “incidents” in U.S. coal mines, 638 were attributable to continuous miner bits.

Justice Richard also conceded that the miners, “faced with management pressure for production, undoubtedly indulged in many dangerous and foolhardy practices in the days immediately preceding the explosion.” But he repeatedly made the point that “the first line of defence” against a methane fire is proper ventilation.

“From all the evidence and the extensive analysis and studies by mining experts, however, it becomes abundantly clear that ventilation in the Westray mine was woefully deficient in almost every respect,” his report states. “The airflow was inadequate for the purpose of clearing methane from the working face during mining and preventing the layering of methane on the roof.”

The report then answered the question raised by some of Westray’s managers: Had it not been for the unsafe practices attributed to the miners, would the explosion of May 9 have occurred? “The answer must be yes, it would have,” Justice Richard concluded. “The consensus of the experts suggests strongly that Westray was an accident waiting to happen.

“It became apparent as the inquiry proceeded that conditions at Westray were of greater significance to what happened than was the source of ignition. Had there been adequate ventilation, had there been adequate treatment of coal dust, and had there been adequate training and an appreciation by management for a safety ethic, those sparks would have faded harmlessly.”

A year ago, Justice Richard predicted that anyone looking for simple and conclusive answers as to how and why the tragedy happened, and who to blame, would be “disappointed.” Indeed, many people are, including some of the families of the victims. But as time goes on, the Westray story appears to be exactly as he described it: “a complex mosaic of actions, omissions, mistakes, incompetence, apathy, cynicism, stupidity, and neglect . . . [with] some well-intentioned but misguided blunders added to the mix.”

It was clear from the onset, Justice Richard wrote, that the loss of 26 lives in the early hours of May 9, 1992, was not the result of a single definable event or misstep. “Only the serenely uninformed (the willfully blind) or the cynically self-serving could be satisfied with such an explanation.”

Nov. 25-27 Gov’t of N.W.T. — “26th Annual NWT Geoscience Forum.” Explorer Hotel. Contact Vicki Swan. Tel: (867) 873-5281. Fax: (867) 920-2145. Web site: http://www.gov.nt.ca

Nov. 29-30 Int’l Investment Conferences — “Western Investment in Mining Conference.” San Francisco, Calif. Contact Int’l Investment Conferences in Miami, Fla. Tel: (305) 669-1963. Toll-free: 1-800-282-7469. Fax: (305) 669-7350. E-mail: iiconf@iiconf.com. Web site: http://www.iiconf.com

Nov. 30-Dec 4 Northwest Mining Association — “104th Annual Meeting.” Includes short courses and exposition. Doubletree Hotel, Spokane Convention Center, Spokane, Wash. Tel: (509) 624-1158. Fax: (509) 624-1241. E-mail: nwma@nwma.org

Dec. 2-4 Metal Bulletin — “Southern African Metals & Mining Conference.” Park Hyatt Hotel, Johannesburg, South Africa. Contact Metal Bulletin in New York. Tel: (212) 213-6202. Toll-free: 1-800-Metal-25. Fax: (212) 213-1870.

Dec. 7-8 Canadian Centre for Occupational Health & Safety — “2-Day Health & Safety Training Course for Managers & Supervisors.”